What Did the Dissenting California Supreme Court Justices Say Regarding SSM?

Next Tuesday, when deciding how to vote on Proposition 8, please consider the statements of the three Supreme Court Justices who wrote dissenting opinions in opposition to the decision to legalize same-sex marriage—which decision overturned the law previously enacted by 61% of California voters.

Justice Baxter & Justice Chin

“So far, Congress, and virtually every court to consider the issue,
has rejected it. Nothing in our Constitution, express or implicit,
compels the majority’s startling conclusion that the age-old
understanding of marriage — an understanding recently
confirmed by an initiative law — is no longer valid.”

“California statutes already recognize same-sex unions and
grant them all the substantive legal rights this state can bestow.”

“The question presented by this case is simple and stark. It
comes down to this: Even though California’s progressive laws,
recently adopted through the democratic process, have
pioneered the rights of same-sex partners to enter legal unions
with all the substantive benefits of opposite-sex legal unions, do
those laws nonetheless violate the California Constitution
because at present, in deference to long and universal tradition,
by a convincing popular vote, and in accord with express
national policy (see fns. 1, 2, ante), they reserve the label
“marriage” for opposite-sex legal unions? I must conclude that
the answer is no.”

“…a bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of
democratic change, now abruptly forestalls that process and
substitutes, by judicial fiat, its own social policy views for those
expressed by the People themselves. Undeterred by the strong
weight of state and federal law and authority, the majority
invents a new constitutional right, immune from the ordinary
process of legislative consideration. The majority finds that our
Constitution suddenly demands no less than a permanent
redefinition of marriage, regardless of the popular will.”

“The majority has violated these principles. It simply does not
have the right to erase, then recast, the age-old definition of
marriage, as virtually all societies have understood it, in order to
satisfy its own contemporary notions of equality and justice.”

Justice Corrigan

“But I, and this court, must acknowledge that a majority of
Californians hold a different view, and have explicitly said so by
their vote. This court can overrule a vote of the people only if the
Constitution compels us to do so. Here, the Constitution does
not. Therefore, I must dissent.”

“It is important to be clear. Under California law, domestic
partners have “virtually all of the same substantive legal
benefits and privileges” available to traditional spouses. (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 45.) I believe the Constitution requires this as a
matter of equal protection. However, the single question in this
case is whether domestic partners have a constitutional right to
the name of “marriage.” Proposition 22 was enacted only eight
years ago. By a substantial majority the people voted to
recognize, as “marriage,” only those unions between a man and
a woman. (Fam. Code, § 308.5.) The majority concludes that
the voters’ decision to retain the traditional definition of
marriage is unconstitutional. I disagree.”

“Domestic partnerships and marriages have the same legal
standing, granting to both heterosexual and homosexual couples
a societal recognition of their lifelong commitment.”

“The legitimate purpose of the statutes defining marriage is to
preserve the traditional understanding of the institution. For that
purpose, plaintiffs are not similarly situated with spouses. While
their unions are of equal legal dignity, they are different because
they join partners of the same gender. Plaintiffs are in the
process of founding a new tradition, unfettered by the boundar-
ies of the old one.“

“The majority ignores the fact that plaintiffs already have those
rights and privileges under the DPA. The majority aptly
articulates how domestic partnerships and marriages are the
same. But it fails to recognize that this case involves only the
names of those unions. The fact that plaintiffs enjoy equal
substantive rights does not situate them similarly with married
couples in terms of the traditional designation of marriage.”

[Originally an advertisement in the Contra Costa Times]